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RISK AND MENTAL HEALTH 
 
Heyman, B. (2004) Risk and mental health. Invited editorial. In B. Heyman (Ed.)  Special 
edition on Risk and Mental Health.  Health, Risk & Society, 6, 297-301. 
 
The papers presented in this special issue draw upon the social science 
(particularly sociology and psychology) of risk in order to illuminate analytical 
issues relating to mental health care, and to contribute to the development of 
these services. As such, this increasing body of work (Buchanan, 2002) draws 
upon two problematic and contested contexts. With respect to mental health, 
no satisfactory answer has ever been given to the classical critiques of the 
1960s (Szasz, 1961; Scheff 1966) which pointed out that mental illness, 
subsequently labelled as disorder and divided into mental and personality 
sub-varieties, could not be diagnosed without at least implicitly defining 
mental health. In turn, the usually undiscussed and unanalysed concept of 
mental health could not be defined without drawing on implicit value 
judgements. Similarly, notions of mental and personality disorder require 
notions, usually unarticulated, of mental and personality order. Since the 
1960s, this debate has, perhaps, become more quiescent. The current 
position might be paraphrased as, ‘Whatever mental (or personality) order 
might mean, it is pretty obvious that some people lack it’. This heuristic 
approach can be justified pragmatically, usually, these days, in terms of the 
avoidance of risk to the disordered person and/or others. 
 
Meanwhile, mental health service policy remains in turmoil, in the UK at least, 
with the government producing its second attempt at a mental health act in 
two years (DoH, 2004). One of the major sources of contention underlying this 
turmoil centres around risk assessment and management is preventative 
detention, namely the circumstances outside sentencing by a court in which a 
person may be detained without their consent because they are deemed to 
pose unacceptable risks to themselves or others. This debate has 
inadvertently fuelled an iconic, and largely false, representation of mental 
health service users as a source of risks, particularly of violence towards 
others, a point which will be returned to in relation to this special issue. 
 
The social science of risk has expanded voluminously over the last two 
decades, underpinned by the work of theoretical leaders in psychology 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Gigerenzer, 2003) and 
anthropology/sociology (Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1994; Foucault). This 
expansion has been fuelled by a wider preoccupation with risks of all sorts in 
late modern societies, which scanning of any news broadcast for risk items 
will illustrate. Although offering a rich variety of theoretical perspectives and 
empirical research, this work does not provide  a clearcut framework on which 
policy makers, service managers and practitioners can draw. The 
psychological and anthropological/sociological traditions, themselves highly 
diverse (Lupton), mostly ignore each other. Other relevant disciplines such as 
economics, epidemiology and statistics add to the cacophony of overlapping 
theoretical voices discussing risk.  
 
Meanwhile, the concept of risk is itself contested, with respect to its ontology, 
the sense in which risks exist, and its epistemology, particularly the extent to 
which risks can be objectively measured. These often unexamined 
conundrums may be illustrated, and no more, by the commonly offered 
proposition of the form that ‘X may be at risk from Y’, as in, ‘The public may 
be at risk if patient A is discharged (from compulsory detention) into the 
community’.  Different views about the meaningfulness of this statement of 
double uncertainty can be offered (). Whether it makes sense or not, such 
formulations illustrate the current facticity of risk, with risks viewed as natural 
phenomena which can exist independently of the observer’s state of 
knowledge. This facticity, itself, reflects the pivotal status of the risk construct 
in science-based secular society. 
 
Drawing on the wobbly underpinnings of risk and mental/personality disorder, 
the papers offered in this special issue can be placed into two categories. The 
first is concerned with the application of social scientific techniques to risk 
assessment and management with the aim of improving mental health 
services by making them more efficient and effective.  The second draws 
upon social scientific resources in order to critique existing service provision. 
This distinction is by no means clear-cut, as the writers with pragmatic 
concerns reflect critically on the techniques which they advocate, whilst critics 
sketch out the implications of their work for service development. 
Nevertheless, this distinction does point up a difference between two 
overlapping approaches to thinking about mental health care in terms of risk. 
 
Mcguire and Ryan offer two very different frameworks for improving mental 
health services by applying risk technologies. Mcguire advocates the actuarial 
approach to risk assessment and management. This approach involves the 
development of inductive models of the risk of future violent offending which 
are derived from multivariate analyses of large aggregated data sets. For 
those who follow this line, accurate prediction, if it could be achieved would 
justify preventative detention, with high risk substituting for criminal culpability 
as grounds for deprivation of liberty. Mcguire points out both the technical and 
moral issues arising from use of this approach. With relatively infrequent 
events such as violent reoffending, even a small degree of over-estimation will 
result in poor positive predictive values, with large numbers detained in order 
to achieve detection of one ‘true’ case, i.e. of a person who would have 
committed a violent offence if they had not remained in preventative 
detention. Even if, counterfactually, future violent offenders could be precisely 
identified, the ethics of detaining people for offences which they had not yet 
committed would remain problematic. 
 
Ryan’s editorial explores a very different approach to developing risk 
technology, derived from the highly successful use of no fault reporting about 
aviation and maritime near misses and accidents. He contrasts the no fault 
reporting system with the use (compulsory in England) of retrospective judicial 
enquiries which apportion blame for serious untoward incidents. This latter 
system generates defensive risk management and directs attention away from 
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